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In this paper we examine whether the value of quality signals (patent activity and founding team 
characteristics) transmitted by emerging biotechnology firms is influenced by the geographic 
distance between venture capitalists and biotechnology firms. In line with the notion that signals 
are more valuable to receivers in environments of elevated information asymmetries and under 
the premise that long distance transactions present such an environment, we empirically reveal 
that patent activity and founding team entrepreneurial experience are more effective in increasing 
venture capital investments when the distance between investors and investees is elevated. Our 
results, therefore, corroborate the rationale that because tacit knowledge circulates mostly within 
local circles, it diminishes the value of signals for local transactions as a priori knowledge about 
potential target firms is more easily assessed by investors. Our study contributes to the literature 
on the factors that drive the value of signals, on the literature that studies the function of patents 
and other forms of intellectual property as a means to boost firm performance and on the 
literature on the geography of venture capital investments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Signaling theory builds on the premise that signals, defined as purposely sent costly pieces of 
information, partly reveal unobserved characteristics of the sender to an interested receiver. 
Credible signals, then, which are too costly to pursue for lesser quality actors, ease transacting by 
allowing the receiver to place more confidence on the unobserved quality of the sender and thus 
reduce the negative effects of information asymmetries (Amit et al., 1990; Connelly et al., 2011; 
Spence, 1973).1   Precisely because the main function of signals is to increase the confidence 
receivers place on the senders in the face of information asymmetries, signals should not only be 
more likely to occur in the presence of high uncertainty (Roberts and Khaire, 2009), but they 
should also carry a higher value for receivers in environments of elevated information 
asymmetries (Janney and Folta, 2003). 
Indeed, there is empirical support for that expectation. Stuart et al. (1999) find that  
signals, in the form of prominent alliance partners, are effective in transactions that involve  
young firms with limited track records. Janney and Folta (2006) conclude that signals, in the 
form of private placements of equity, are more relevant for those young firms that are subject to 
higher uncertainty. Park and Mezias (2005) show that the stock market relies more heavily on 
alliances as signals when the level of industry uncertainty is high.   Arthurs et al. (2009), in the 
context of initial public offerings, report that the higher the uncertainty surrounding a given firm, 
the more effective the signals it transmits. Finally, Hsu and Ziedonis (2013) and Hoenen et al. 
(2014) find that the signaling function of patent activity is more effective in inducing venture 
                                                          
1 Extended literature demonstrates the effectiveness of signals in communicating value to customers, investors, 
potential employees and possible alliance partners (e.g. Chung and Kalnins, 2001; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Davila et 
al., 2003; Higgins and Gulati, 2006; Mishra et al., 1998; Ozmel et al., 2012). 
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capital investments for early rounds of financing, when information asymmetries between 
venture capitalists and target firms are elevated. 
Prior studies, then, have contextualized the level of information asymmetries and have 
approximated the value receivers ascribe to signals by studying the age of the sender, the 
uncertainty of its environment and the degree of familiarity between senders and receivers. 
However, little attention has been paid to an additional transactional characteristic that can 
significantly determine the degree of information asymmetries between transacting parties and 
can ultimately shape the value receivers place on signals: the geographic distance between the 
sender and the receiver of the signal.  
Information asymmetries increase with distance (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Ivkovic 
and Weisbenner, 2005; Portes et al., 2001). It is therefore important to know whether the value 
receivers ascribe to signals also increases with the distance between two transacting parties, and 
we examine this question in this study. Because knowledge is sticky and hence difficult to move 
across space (von Hippel, 1994), the marginal cost of knowledge transmission is an increasing 
function of distance.  This explains why larger distances may discourage the transmission of 
(tacit) knowledge (Audretsch, 1998) and could lead to increases in information asymmetries. 
Given that the costs of signaling do not typically vary with geographic distance, signals may be 
even more relevant and valuable for transactions between geographically distant parties.  
To study this proposition, we analyze two signals often employed by emerging  
knowledge-intensive firms that can lack a track record: patent activity, including patent 
applications and granted patents, and the entrepreneurial experience and academic status of firm 
founders. Using data from first round venture capital investments in 586 U.S-based emerging 
biotechnology firms from 2001 to 2011, we associate the amount of capital raised by each firm 
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through first round of financing with its patent activity and indicators of serial entrepreneurship 
and academic excellence among firm founders prior to the investment. Methodologically, to test 
whether the geographic distance between venture capitalists and the biotechnology firms they 
invest in conditions the impact of those signals on the firm funding level, we interact the 
measures of signals with the measures of the distance between the two parties and examine the 
statistical significance of the combined measure.  We also control for many factors that can 
influence the size of venture capital investment in a given firm, including the market value of 
patents which arises from the monopoly rights they afford. We therefore first approximate the 
signaling value of patents and then investigate how such value is affected by the distance 
between the investor and the recipient. Along the same lines, by separating out the effects of 
academic and entrepreneurial experience of firm founders we also examine what venture 
capitalists value most when they invest in firms founded by academics.  
Our focus on emerging firms is consistent with the notion that signaling is more 
important during the early stages of firm growth, when the typical lack of a track record and 
increased level of information asymmetries make the evaluation of investment targets a thorny 
task. As such, it is at this stage we expect venture capitalists to place more value to quality 
signals. We break new ground by examining whether the value that venture capitalists place on 
signals depends on their distance with target firms. We also complement previous studies that 
have examined the effect of signals in attracting distant investors in later stages of firm growth 
where the venture capitalist is already in the firm and the next stepping stone for the company is 
the attraction of additional investors, often via an initial public offering (Mäkelä and Maula, 
2008; Powell et al., 2002; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011).  
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Relatedly, we contribute to the literature on the function of patents and other forms of 
intellectual property for attracting firm financing (e.g. Audretsch et al., 2012; Block et al., 2014; 
Conti et al., 2013; Greenberg, 2013; Hoenen et al., 2014; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). These studies 
analyze a number of issues, including whether patents act as a signal and whether the signaling 
function of patents is more pronounced during early stages of firm growth, but do not examine 
the impact of the geographic distance between agents on the strength and value of the signal. 
Accordingly, our work improves the understanding of the conditions where patents lead to 
greater external funding for a given firm.  Furthermore, our study offers a novel test on whether 
patents act primarily as a signal or whether they are valued by their investors mostly for the 
monopoly rents they can bring about. If patents act mainly as a signal, then we would not expect 
them to have as significant an impact on venture capital investments in short distance 
transactions.  Locally circulated knowledge about a given firm can reduce the degree of 
information asymmetries between investors and potential investees (Asheim and Gertler, 2005; 
Bathelt et al., 2004; Florida and Kenney, 1988) and hence mitigate the need for signals as well as 
the value that investors may place on them. In contrast, if patents are valued mostly for the 
exclusion rights they carry, we would expect them to increase venture capital funding even for 
investors who allocate funds to nearby firms.  
Finally, our work informs the literature on the geography of venture capital investments 
(Gupta and Sapienza, 1992; Kolympiris et al., 2011; Lutz et al., 2013; Powell et al., 2002; 
Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). While venture capital firms have a general preference to invest 
locally (Cumming and Dai, 2010; Powell et al., 2002; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001), here we 
investigate whether signals can induce larger investments in distant targets at their early stages of 
firm growth.   
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We focus on venture capital investments in biotechnology for several reasons. First, 
biotechnology firms are frequent investment targets of venture capitalists reflecting not only the 
potential for high returns but also their need for external capital, which is difficult to meet 
through bank lending and other forms of traditional finance due to inherent risks in the industry 
(Baum and Silverman, 2004; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Second, long distance venture capital 
investments occur in the industry with some frequency. East/West Cost investors fund West/East 
Coast firms (Powell et al., 2002). Third, the lengthy R&D cycles of biotechnology coupled with 
strict regulatory regimes  prohibit  emerging  firms  from developing  an  early  track  record  
which  can approximate future performance. The very same structural characteristics of 
biotechnology startups lead venture capitalists investing in this industry to often rely on signals 
(Higgins et al., 2011; Janney and Folta, 2003). All in all, these circumstances suggest that if the 
value venture capitalists place on signals is influenced by the geographic distance of their 
potential targets we should be able to detect such an influence in that industry.  
We proceed as follows: In section 2, we explore the existing literature and discuss our 
theoretical expectations. In sections 3 and 4 we discuss the methodology and the dataset of the 
empirical study. In section 5, we present our empirical results and we conclude in section 6.  
2. How geographic distance can influence the effectiveness of signals 
 
In their most common form, venture capital firms (VCFs) raise funds from institutional investors 
such as pension funds and university endowments, invest these funds in new ventures that have 
the potential to yield high returns and, in large part, tie their compensation to the performance of 
the investment targets (Zider, 1998). Because VCFs seek high returns they tend to invest in 
relatively young promising companies in knowledge-based industries, such as biotechnology, in 
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which the risks are pronounced but the returns, if realized, can also be considerable (Gompers 
and Lerner, 2001, 2004).  
Mainly because of the long research cycles in biotechnology, firms in this industry rarely 
have a track record in their early stages of development. Even when these firms are fully aware 
of their potential, they typically possess private information regarding their quality, which is not 
easily discerned by the VCFs (Amit et al., 1990; Gompers, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2004; 
Sahlman, 1990). In turn, such information asymmetries complicate the investment decisions of 
VCFs because the problem of adverse selection is ever-present (Akerlof, 1970; Amit et al., 1990; 
Mishra et al., 1998).2 In order to mitigate adverse selection VCFs typically invest in rounds of 
financing. Under this scheme, funds are provided in separate sequential points in time and 
financing continues only if firms meet certain, mainly technical, milestones (Gompers, 1995).  
Information asymmetries between VCFs and target firms are therefore more acute before the first 
round of financing as VCFs have not previously worked with the firm and the level of familiarity 
between investors and investees is low.  It follows that because first round investments present 
an environment of exacerbated uncertainty, it is in this round we expect VCFs to place more 
value to signals. This is why we focus our discussion and subsequent empirical analysis on this 
round.  
To prevent investments in ‘lemons’ VCFs are highly selective and put substantial time  
and effort in scouting firms and evaluating the promise of their investments targets (Amit et al., 
1990; Baum and Silverman, 2004).  This time and effort is primarily devoted towards assessing 
                                                          
2 Uncertain market conditions, complex regulatory regimes and a general scarcity of tangible assets exacerbate  
the issue (Carpenter and Petersen, 2002; Gompers and Lerner, 2001). Also note that under certain conditions a firm  
might have incentives to purposely withhold information, either because private information implicates the  
entrepreneurial opportunity that it is trying to protect, or because the entrepreneur might want to conceal negative 
information regarding the quality of the firm (Shane and Cable, 2002; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). 
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the quality of the firm before the first investment takes place.  However, in the case of 
knowledge-based young firms, overall quality and promise are tightly linked to the quality of 
knowledge supporting their research efforts.  Precisely because knowledge quality can be tacit 
(Johnson et al., 2002), the selection process of VCFs can become increasingly difficult when the 
target firm is at a distance as  tacit knowledge is more easily gained when investors and investees 
are closely located (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Foray, 2004; von Hippel, 1994). For this 
reason, VCFs circulate knowledge about investment targets via networks which are often built on 
social capital, interpersonal contacts and other spatially bounded means of knowledge transfer 
(Bygrave, 1988; Florida and Kenney, 1988). It follows that the ex ante evaluation of untested 
target firms that are under consideration for first time investments is generally easier when these 
firms are located nearby.3  Spatial proximity assists VCFs in gathering (tacit) knowledge about 
the target firms and decreases the level of information asymmetries. Indeed, empirical evidence 
indicates that VCFs have a general preference for local investments (Chen et al., 2011; Cumming 
and Dai, 2010; Powell et al., 2002; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Tian, 2011). 4  
Notwithstanding the general tendency for local investments, VCFs do engage in long 
distance financing (Powell et al., 2002), especially when the promise of the target firm is  
significant. In such cases, VCFs use alternative strategies to cope with the associated information 
asymmetries. Most frequently, for first round investments, but sometimes in later rounds too, 
VCFs use syndication schemes in which they co-invest with one or more local VCF(s) (Fritsch 
and Schilder, 2008; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Beyond syndication, VCFs may also rely on 
                                                          
3 Note that contrary to other forms of capital infusion, the involvement of VCFs in target firms extends to  
providing advice, management support and other value-added activities (Sahlman, 1990). Spatial proximity is  
also relevant for those activities (Lerner, 1995) because it can ease the oversight of the target firms. 
4 In related evidence outside the venture capital industry, the number of local investments in the portfolio of fund 
managers is disproportionally large (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999) and fund managers perform better when investing 
in these local funds (Coval and Moskowitz, 2001). 
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signals as a way to mitigate the effects of information asymmetries for long distance first round 
transactions (Busenitz et al., 2005; Toole and Turvey, 2009). Indeed, there is evidence that VCFs 
are more likely to invest in distant firms in which other VCFs have previously invested (Mäkelä 
and Maula, 2008; Powell et al., 2002; Ragozzino and Reuer, 2011).  This behavior is consistent 
with the idea that VCFs use signals in distant transactions and indicates the trust VCFs show to 
the investment choices of their peers. However, little is known about the value placed by VCFs 
on the ex ante signals sent by start-ups prior to first round financing.  
All in all, given that receivers of signals place more value to them in environments 
characterized by increased information asymmetries (Arthurs et al., 2009; Hoenen et al., 2014; 
Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013; Ozmel et al., 2012; Stuart et al., 1999) we expect signals to be more 
effective in raising the amount of first round financing for distant transactions when compared to 
transactions between closely located VCFs and target firms. We build this expectation on the 
observation that short distance transactions are typically less susceptible to the sort of 
information asymmetries that underpin most first round investments.   
2.1 Signals used by biotechnology firms before the first round of financing  
 
A relevant question then is which signals are available to biotechnology firms during their early 
stages of growth and more specifically before the first round of financing? These signals need to 
satisfy three main conditions. First, they need to be observable and costly to imitate (Spence, 
1973). Second, they need to adequately convey the knowledge available to emerging 
biotechnology firms since their tangible assets are limited (Hicks, 1995). Third, they need to be 
valued by VCFs so that they lead to increases in the level of first round of financing.  
One way by which biotechnology firms can convey their knowledge is through  
certain characteristics of their founder(s). Founder characteristics are observable  
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through firm presentations, websites and other information featuring the biographies of the 
founding team. They are also costly. For instance, the opportunity costs of eminent university 
professors and other high profile professionals who are often among the founders of 
biotechnology firms are high (Audretsch and Stephan, 1996; Zucker et al., 1998). As such, 
founder characteristics meet condition 1 described above. Founder characteristics can also 
convey knowledge because high technology firms at the early development stages often resemble 
the qualities of their founders (Cooper and Bruno, 1977). Hence, high profile professionals can 
leverage their reputation to convey the underlying quality of their firms (Bonardo et al., 2011; 
Certo, 2003) and as such founder characteristics meet condition 2 above. But what kinds of 
founder characteristics are valued by venture capitalists so that condition 3 is also met? Within 
the broad literature documenting the effects of founders on firm growth (Ding, 2011; Hannan et 
al., 2006; Klepper, 2002; Roberts et al., 2011), a number of studies has shown that VCFs prefer 
to invest in entrepreneurs with earlier business experience (Gompers et al., 2010; Hsu, 2007; 
Mueller et al., 2012; Wright et al., 1997). This is likely so because experience can help 
entrepreneurs  cope with recurring problems, enhance their ability to spot profitable 
opportunities and the like (Baron and Ensley, 2006). For academic founders, previous 
business/entrepreneurial experience may therefore be important (Lockett and Wright, 2005).  
VCFs may also value the academic prominence of founders of early stage biotechnology 
firms as an additional signal of their knowledge.  Because  of  the  knowledge-intensive  
character  of  biotechnology,  the  core technological innovations upon which the firms are built 
often rely on academics (Wright et al., 2004) who are regularly founders of biotechnology firms 
(Zucker et al., 1998). Importantly, preeminent academic scientists tend to start successful 
biotechnology firms (Zucker et al., 1998). When considering these observations together with the 
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favorable attitude of VCFs towards firms founded/managed by individuals with high academic 
achievements  (Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Hsu, 2007; Mueller et al., 2012) we conclude that the 
presence of academics in the founding team, especially eminent ones, may serve as a signal of 
quality for biotechnology firms with limited track record.  
Patent activity is yet another signal that biotechnology firms can use.  Patent  
information is freely available from public sources but patents themselves are costly to acquire 
and maintain (Graham et al., 2009). Hence, patents conform to the basic characteristics of a 
signal. But do patents convey knowledge and are they valued by VCFs? A number of studies 
have demonstrated that VCFs are attracted to firms with patent activity (Audretsch et al., 2012; 
Conti et al., 2013; Engel and Keilbach, 2007; Hoenen et al., 2014; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013). 
Patents also convey knowledge for two main reasons: First, they represent inventions and 
innovations (Acs et al., 2002; Igami, 2013) which are the outcomes of knowledge development 
efforts. Second, the patent acquisition process entails interactions with patent examiners so that 
the prior art of the submitted application is adjusted, and the claims of the patents are clarified 
and placed within the context of existing technologies and innovations. As such, the patent 
application process compels firms to keep up to date with the latest scientific developments in 
rapidly evolving fields such as biotechnology, enhance their knowledge and refine their 
technology development strategies.  
In sum, we expect patent activity, as well as the entrepreneurial experience and academic 
prominence in the founding team to act as signals that can help firms to increase their first round 
of investment as they are costly, observable, they transmit knowledge and they are valued by 
venture capitalists. We expect these signals to be more effective and valuable in long distance 
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transactions because it is in these types of transactions that information asymmetries are elevated 
and hence venture capitalists place more value to signals. 
3. Methods 
 
To test whether signals are more effective and valuable for long distance transactions between 
VCFs and biotechnology firms we build econometric models in which the level of funding raised 
during the first round of financing is regressed on variables that measure patent activity and 
founding team characteristics prior to the investment. To explicitly test the impact of geographic 
distance on the effectiveness of these signals in stimulating larger investments, we include a 
variable that measures the distance between the VCF and the target firm and we interact this 
variable with the signals we study. We expect the interaction terms to be positive, indicating that 
signals are more valuable for long distance transactions. 
Formally, the model takes the following form:  
 
ln(𝑌𝑖) = 𝑋𝑖𝛽 +  𝜀                                                                                                              (1) 
 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖 is the natural logarithm of the amount of funds received by the 
focal firm 𝑖 in the first round of venture capital funding, 𝑋𝑖 is the design matrix including the 
variables we discuss below and the 𝛽𝑠 are the associated coefficients.  
The first signal we study is patent activity which we measure with the patent applications 
submitted by the firms in our sample prior to the first round financing they received and with the 
patents granted to the firms during the same period. More specifically, following previous works 
that constructed patent variables in the same way (e.g. Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Toole and 
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Czarnitzki, 2007) each of the two measures takes the value of 1 if the firm had applied for a patent 
or was granted a patent before the investment occurred and 0 otherwise. 5 6 
The reason we employ two measures of patent activity is that the signal transmitted by 
granted patents can be meaningfully different than the signal transmitted by patent applications.  
For instance, throughout the examination process patent applications may signal a firm that is not 
sitting idle but it updates its knowledge and extends its experience by revising the claims of the 
patent, populating the list of prior art with new references, and refining its innovation strategy. 
These are important considerations since knowledge in biotechnology is continuously updated and 
breakthroughs may come from newer discoveries at any time (see Humphries, 2010; McNamee 
and Ledley, 2012 for specific examples). As such, new knowledge development is crucial and 
patent applications may capture such a process more effectively than granted patents. Instead, 
granted patents can signal a firm that has developed original knowledge and has gone through the 
patent application process successfully in the past. Conceptually, then, we expect granted patents 
to approximate the knowledge a company has already developed and owns while patent 
applications to approximate the knowledge a company is developing. It is interesting to note that 
there is empirical evidence which reinforces the potential for differential signaling function of 
                                                          
5 To avoid double-counting if an application is granted patent rights before the first round of financing, we measure 
only the granted patent as a measure of patent activity and not the application.  
6 Originally we used the count of patents and applications as our measures of patent activity. However, constructing 
the interaction terms using the counts and including them in the empirical specifications increased the 
multicollinearity index well above the safe threshold of 30 and hence raised inference concerns. When we measured 
patent activity with dummy variables (and constructed the interaction terms) the index dropped significantly to 
below 30. Importantly, the dummy variables are roughly equivalent to continuous measures of patent activity as the 
latter are heavily left skewed with the vast majority of the firms having no patent activity. As such, we opt to use the 
dummy variables because they lead to lower multicollinearity indices, and, hence higher confidence in inference. 
Still, in section 5.2 we present estimates from models omitting from the analysis firms with inflated records of 
patent activity. The results are qualitatively similar to the baseline estimates we present in Table 3. Alternatively, we 
could omit certain control variables in order to reduce the multicollinearity index. That option raises significant 
concerns on the interpretation of our findings due to omitted variable bias. Such bias is particularly relevant in our 
application as teasing out the signaling function of patents is challenging mainly because a host of factors  can 
explain the growth of venture capital funds for a given firm. 
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granted patents and patent applications. Specifically, a few studies have shown that patent 
applications are more effective than granted patents in shortening the time that venture capitalists 
invest in a firm and in increasing the amount of funds invested (Baum and Silverman, 2004; 
Haeussler et al., 2014; Hoenen et al., 2014). 
Because we are interested in the signaling value of patent activity, we need to account for 
the market value of monopoly rights that patents offer, which can also attract investors and raise 
the amount of invested capital. Estimating with precision the market value that patent monopoly 
rights can bring about is a difficult task partly because the true market value of an invention is 
often unobservable and, if observed, it is difficult to attribute solely to the patent that protects the 
invention. A setting in which patent market value can be closely approximated is at patent auctions 
where patents are traded between interested parties. This setting is appropriate not only because 
the auction price is observed but also, and perhaps more importantly, because what is traded is 
only the patent and not its owner. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the signaling function of granted 
patents drive their auction prices. Crucially, the price paid for a patent in such auctions correlates 
strongly with an observed feature of the patent: the number of times the patent is cited by later 
patents (forward citations) (Fischer and Leidinger, 2014; Odasso et al., 2014; Sneed and Johnson, 
2009). Based on this evidence, and with an eye on previous works demonstrating the relevance of 
forward citations as a measure of patent value (e.g. Gambardella et al., 2008; Harhoff et al., 2003), 
we employ forward citations as a measure of the economic value of a patent.  Because older patents 
have a longer time frame to gather forward citations we measure forward citations per year. 
The second signal we examine is the entrepreneurial experience and academic standing of 
the founding team. We employ two different empirical specifications to more extensively test their 
potential impacts. Specification 1 employs the signal used in Hoenen et al. (2014). In particular, 
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we approximate the academic standing and business experience of the founding team with a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a member of the founding team has high academic 
standing and/or earlier experience in founding a firm (Foundersignal). In Specification 2 we use 
two separate measures to characterize the standing of the founding team. The first measure, 
Entrepreneurialsignal, indicates whether one of the members of the founding team has previously 
started a firm.7 The second measure, Academicsignal, assumes increasing values with the highest 
academic rank held by members of the founding team and ranges from 0 to 5 with 0 indicating that 
there is no academic in the founding team, 1 through 4 indicate increasing professorial standing (a 
lecturer, an assistant, an associate and a full professor) while 5 indicates that a member of the 
founding team holds a distinguished and/or named professorship and/or is a member of the 
Academy of Sciences and/or has won a Nobel Prize.  
To test our expectation that signals are more valuable for long distance transactions we 
include an additional variable which measures (in logarithmic form) the distance between the 
funding VCF and the target firm (for syndicate investments we measure the distance to the closest 
VCF).8 We then interact the distance variable with the signal measures described above and expect 
a positive sign for these interaction terms. 
                                                          
7 Alternatively, it could be argued that serial entrepreneurs have more access to venture capital because a VCF might 
be more willing to engage in repeated interactions with an entrepreneur, because private information regarding the 
entrepreneur is gained in earlier investment. However, in general the frequency of such repeated interactions is 
relatively low (Bengtsson, 2013; Wright et al., 1997). 
8 We do not expect distance to have a linear effect on the effectiveness of signals. For instance, a move from the 5th 
to the 6th mile should not have the same meaning as a move from, say, the 1005th to the 1006th mile even though in 
both cases the change (1 mile) is the same. This is why we use the natural log of distance. To calculate the distances 
we use the straight distance formula (arcos(sin(lat1).sin(lat2)+cos(lat1).cos(lat2).cos(long2−long1)) ×3963 ). For the 
(short) distances that we look at, the straight line distance closely resembles the driving distance but unlike the 
driving distance, it does not change over time due to newly constructed roads and other residential developments. 
This is relevant for our application because we study transactions that spread over a decade and, hence, need 
comparable distances across time. In cases where more than one VCF invested in the focal firm we measure the 
distance to the closest VCF because in syndication schemes the closest VCF typically assumes most of the oversight 
and consulting roles (Ferrary, 2010; Fritsch and Schilder, 2012) . 
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3.1 Control Variables 
The design matrix X in equation 1 above includes a number of control variables which can 
influence the level of first round financing each firm receives.9  Each VCF investment that a firm 
receives is proportional to the valuation of the firm ex ante and the equity level the VCFs 
collects.  It follows that we need to account for both of those factors but finding direct measures 
for such factors is empirically challenging. As such, we use two separate indicators that can 
approximate the conceptual variables. Specifically, we first include dummy variables (seed, 
early, and expansion) that correspond to the growth stage of the firm when the VCF investment 
took place.10 Because the valuation of firms, ex ante, increases with the stage of firm growth 
(Cumming and Dai, 2011) these indicators should approximate firm valuation.  Importantly, 
early and later stage investments by VCFs are also associated with different equity levels 
acquired (Beaton, 2010; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003).  As such, the dummy indicators should 
be correlated with the amount of equity secured by VCFs. Given the increased valuation of firms 
at later stages of firm growth, we expect a positive sign for the indicators representing later 
stages of firm growth.  We also construct a second indicator to approximate the level of equity 
VCFs receive for their investments. Because VCFs with stronger reputation typically receive 
larger equity than investors with weaker reputation for similar investments (Hsu, 2004) we also 
include a variable that reflects the Lee et al. (2011) reputation score of the highest ranked 
funding VCF of the first round of financing (VCFreputation).  
                                                          
9Additional discussion on the impact of certain control variables included in our model on venture capital funding is 
presented in some of previous work (Hoenen et al., 2014).  
10 Seed stage funds are typically small amounts directed primarily towards proving a concept. Early stage funds are 
directed mainly towards product development. Funds directed towards the expansion stage are used, in large part, to 
boost market entry or strengthen R&D (Jeng and Wells, 2000). There are also funds directed towards later stage 
financing, such as buy-outs or acquisitions. 
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The availability of funds from the VCFs may also influence the amount invested in the 
first round of financing, overall. Because such availability is often largely determined by the 
number of investors that spread the risks of their investments (i.e. by the syndication size)  
(Lockett and Wright, 2001) as well as by the capital available to the investors (Gupta and 
Sapienza, 1992; Tian, 2011) we include two variables that measure the number of investors as 
well as their average size (SyndicateInvestors, SyndicateSize), and expect positive signs for both 
coefficients.  
We also include the age of the focal firm at the round of financing (Age) as a control 
variable in the model.  We do not form strong priors with regard to the direction the age of firms 
can move the amount of funds received because VCFs may evaluate positively older firms due to 
higher experience and survival but they may also view negatively older firms that have not 
received previous financing. 
To incorporate in the analysis year-to-year variations, such as “hot IPO market” periods 
(Lowry and Schwert, 2002), that can encourage or discourage venture capital investments at an 
aggregate level we include in our empirical models a set of year dummies that match with the 
year in which the investment took place. We do not form expectations for the signs of their 
coefficients.   
Agglomeration externalities (e.g. knowledge spillovers and network effects) can also help 
biotechnology firms improve their performance and thus increase their funding levels (Coenen et 
al., 2004; Döring and Schnellenbach, 2006; Gittelman, 2007; Kolympiris et al., 2011). To 
account for such effects we include the following variables in the model: a) UniversitiesInMSA 
which measures the number of universities that perform biotechnology related research and are 
located in the same Metropolitan Statistical Area as the focal firm and b) several indicators that 
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measure the density of VCFs (VCFarea 0010, VCFarea 1020) and the number of patents granted 
to biotechnology firms (PATENTarea 0010, PATENTarea 1020) within 0–10 and 10–20 miles 
from the origin firm, respectively. We expect positive signs for the corresponding coefficients. 
4. Data Sources and Presentation 
To conduct the analysis we started by sourcing all venture capital first round investments by 
independent VCFs in dedicated biotechnology firms from 2001 up to 201111 using Thomson 
Reuter’s SDC Platinum Database (SDC). Appendix Table 1 describes the construction of each 
variable we use in some detail.  In the remaining part of this section, we focus on the variables we 
employ in our empirical models as shown in Table 1.  
---Table 1 about here--- 
The sample we employ draws upon Hoenen et al. (2014).12  As noted above, a noteworthy change 
from Hoenen et al. (2014) is that in Specification 2 we use a sharper way to account for the 
signaling function of the founding team as we decompose the Foundersignal variable into two 
separate indicators: EntrepreneurialSignal and AcademicSignal. We collected the data for both of 
these variables by visiting the websites of the sample firms. 
                                                          
11 We start our analysis in 2001 because before then the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) did 
not publish patent applications. Also note that the dataset does not include investments from corporate venture 
capital. As well, while SDC reports the total amount invested in each round, it does not report the round investment 
per venture capital firm. As such, we cannot weight the distance to the closest VCF by the amount it invested. While 
this issue does not hold for the majority of the sample firms because they received first round investment only from 
one VCF (see Table 1), the finding that in syndicated investments the closest VCF is typically the one conducting 
the main scouting for investment targets (Fritsch and Schilder, 2012) alleviates concerns about the effect of this non-
weighting on the estimated parameters. 
12 The main finding from that study was that having applied for a patent increased the level of first round of 
financing for biotechnology firms by 7.7 percent while patent activity had no impact on the level of funds raised 
during the second round of financing.   
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In total, the dataset includes 586 first round venture capital investments in 586 
biotechnology firms.  As shown in Table 1 the average distance between the recipient firms and 
the closest VCFs investing in such firms is 400 miles. Given that almost half of the observations 
are within a 20 miles threshold level (median: 20.63) the sample average is influenced by a small 
number of firms that received investments from VCFs located across the country.  On average, the 
sample firms received $7.2 million in the first round of financing which was realized for half of 
the firms when they were less than 1.3 years old. The average $7.2 million investment is, however, 
inflated by few firms that attracted significantly more funds than the rest (e.g. the modal value is 
$1million). 
With regards to the signals we study, the vast majority of the firms did not have any patent 
activity before the first round of financing. 66 firms had applied for at least one patent and 32 were 
granted at least one patent before the investment.13 
The Foundersignal indicates that 1 out of 5 firms had at least one member in the founding 
team with entrepreneurial experience and/or with academic standing. In particular, approximately 
1 out of 10 founders had earlier entrepreneurial experience while a sizeable portion of sample firms 
were (co)founded by academicians, a small share of which of preeminent status. Most founding 
teams, however, did not include an academic or a serial entrepreneur.   
 As it pertains to the regional environment, on average, a firm in the sample was 
surrounded by high patent activity and 39 VCFs located within a 20 miles radius. Figure 1 
                                                          
13 The heavy representation of firms without patent activity in the sample supports our empirical choice to employ 
corresponding dummy variables.  More specifically, 531 firms did not have any applications, 29 firms had 1 
application, 9 firms had 2 applications, 14 firms had between 2 and 7 applications and 2 firms had 10 and 13 
applications respectively. Granted patents had a similar left skewed distribution as well. The fact that the sample 
includes firms with varying degrees of patent activity is relevant in that it mitigates potential concerns of overstressing 
the significance of patents that could result from the tendency of better firms to patent more and generally better 
protect their intellectual property assets (Helmers and Rogers, 2011).  
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explains, in large part, these statistics as it shows that the majority of the sample firms were 
located in traditional biotechnology clusters of the East and West Coast of the United States. 
Nevertheless, a meaningful share of the firms was located outside the traditional biotechnology 
hubs in locations such as Austin, TX and Boulder, CO. This latter observation implies that our 
results are not specific to the traditional biotech clusters. 
---Figure 1 and Table 2 about here--- 
 
In Table 2 we present the correlation coefficients for the variables described above. While in 
general the correlation coefficients assume low values, those between the level terms of the 
signal variables and the interaction terms between the signals and the distance are high (0.5, 
0.75, 0.79, 0.81, 0.83). This suggests that there may be some overlap in the information provided 
by the level and interaction terms on the dependent variable. As we explain below, this point 
becomes relevant when we opt to not include the level terms in our baseline specifications. 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline Model  
Table 3 includes the estimates from the baseline specifications in which we omit the level terms.  
---Table 3 about here--- 
Model 1 does not include the interaction terms we use to test our theoretical expectations. 
We include it for comparison purposes to Models 2 and 3, which present the coefficients from 
Specifications 1 and 2, respectively. We cluster the standard errors at the state level.14 We do so 
to account for the possibility that firms located in the same state underperform or overperform 
                                                          
14 Inference remains unchanged even when we employ White’s heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. 
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jointly due to unobserved state-specific features promoting innovation, such as the quality of 
entrepreneurial coaching provided by local agencies, and because we expect the distance measures 
to be more similar among firms in the same state. The F-tests across all empirical models as well 
as the adjusted R2 suggest that our empirical models have explanatory power. The multicollinearity 
condition index is below the generally regarded as safe threshold of 30 (Belsley et al., 1980).  
We first evaluate whether geographic distance influences the value of the Foundersignal 
to VCFs in Model 2 (Table 3).  In this model, the slope coefficient associated with distance 
between the firm and the nearest VCF is allowed to change when founders are eminent and/or 
have business experience. Based on the fitted model, we find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly positive (0.0981), and the marginal effect of distance on VC 
funding levels more than doubles when the firm’s founder is eminent/experienced. Hence, we 
find empirical support for the hypothesis that geographic distance influences the signaling value 
of the founding team characteristics, as measured by the Foundersignal indicator. This result is 
also consistent with simple averages as firms that were founded by serial entrepreneurs and/or 
eminent academics received, on average, $4.2 million more funding than the rest of the firms in 
our sample.   
Next, we evaluate whether the academic standing and previous experience with starting a 
firm among firm founders have different value as signals and whether they are more effective in 
raising the amount of first round financing for distant transactions. In Models 3a-3c we use two 
separate measures to characterize the standing of the founding team: AcademicSignal and 
EntrepreneurialSignal. We evaluate the relevance of first for each of these signals separately (in 
Models 3a and 3b) and then jointly (in Model 3c).  
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While AcademicSignal*Distance is statistically significant and positive (0.0129) in Model 
3a, the marginal effect of distance on VC funding levels when the firm’s founder has high 
academic standing does not increase appreciably due to the weak quantitative impact of this signal. 
In contrast, when we estimate the joint impact of distance and the firm founders’ business 
experience on the VC funding levels, through EntrepreneurialSignal*Distance in Model 3b, the 
result is quite different. Based on the fitted version of this model, we find that the estimated 
coefficient on this variable is significantly positive (0.088) and the marginal effect of distance on 
VC funding levels increases by 75% when the firm’s founder is a serial entrepreneur. These results 
are confirmed when both indicators are included in Model 3c as their coefficients remain roughly 
the same. In addition, the AcademicSignal interaction is now statistically not different from zero. 
Taken together these results suggest that business experience as a signal matters more when the 
distance between investors and recipients increases while academic prominence does not seem to 
have such an effect.  
In all of the Models 2 and 3, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between 
patent applications and distance is significantly positive and varies between 0.0655 and 0.0733 in 
value. As such, the marginal effect of distance on VC funding levels increases (depending on the 
model) by 50-70% when the firm has patent applications. The positive and statistically significant 
coefficient of the interaction term between patent applications and distance is therefore also 
supportive of the theoretical expectation that the larger the distance, the larger the positive effect 
of patent applications on the level of venture capital funds received by the firms in the sample.  
  The interaction term between granted patents and distance in all empirical models 
(Models 2 and 3) is very small in size and, for the most part, statistically not different from zero. 
The insignificance of granted patents as a signal is an interesting result, especially since patent 
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applications are found to have signaling value. By definition, applications do not have an exclusion 
value because patent claims are not finalized until the patent issues. As such, patent applications 
may be a stronger signal than granted patents because they convey both a learning-by-doing 
process and a fine-tuning process (Hoenen et al., 2014). The learning-by-doing process refers to 
the fact that every patent needs to conform to the same criteria of novelty, usefulness and non-
obviousness. Accordingly, the more often a firm submits patent applications the more likely it will 
learn how to satisfy these three criteria. The fine-tuning process refers to the interactions between 
applicants and patent officers after an application is submitted. Following the initial application, 
firms learn more about the prior art in their technology development area from communication 
with the patent examiner, redefine their claims, and overall get exposed to a process that can 
deepen and update their knowledge. This deepening and updating of knowledge is particularly 
important in fast evolving industries such as biotechnology where breakthroughs are often the 
result of the very latest techniques and cutting edge discoveries (see Humphries, 2010; McNamee 
and Ledley, 2012 for specific examples). Hence, while a granted patent may represent what a firm 
has learned, an application may better signify what a firm is learning. Given that learning processes 
are important for fast-evolving industries, patent applications in biotechnology may be a stronger 
signal because investors value firms that can evolve over time by keeping up with the latest 
developments in the industry and do not sit idle. 
It is worth noting, that the estimated coefficients in Model 3c where all the interaction 
terms of the signals with distance are included suggest that the marginal effect of distance on VC 
funding levels increases by 125% when the firm’s founder is a serial entrepreneur and the firm has 
patent applications. The individual effects of the two signals are distinct and remain stable across 
all specifications. Hence, our findings suggest that signals increase the level of venture capital 
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funding primarily in environments where information asymmetries are more pronounced, and 
hence investors place more value on them, such as when the geographic distance between the VCF 
and the target firm is extended.  For distant target firms, VCFs appear less able to assess the quality 
of the firm in question (Rosiello and Parris, 2009; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001; Zook, 2002) and as 
a means to mitigate the effects of the associated increase in information asymmetries they tend to 
rely on signals transmitted by firms seeking for investments.  
Importantly, our findings also shed new light on the ongoing discussion whether patent 
activity is valued by investors primarily as a signal or as a means to gain monopoly rights (Hoenig 
and Henkel, 2014). The granted patents signal and the forward citations control proxy for the 
economic value of patents are statistically insignificant across specifications. Therefore, similar to 
previous works (Hoenen et al., 2014; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2013) our findings are supportive of the 
explanation that patents serve, in large part, a signaling function. More to it, if patents were valued 
more for the exclusion value they carry, then we would expect them to attract investors even in 
environments of reduced information asymmetries. Short distance investments are an example of 
such an environment. Yet, what we consistently find is that patent activity does not increase VC 
investments for short distance transactions, which then provides evidence in favor of a signaling 
function. Perhaps, what can explain this finding is that specifically for patents covering drug-
related inventions (hence the sorts of patents we study), infringements are common (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001). Accordingly, while in principle the exclusion value afforded by the 
monopoly rights of a patent is present, VCFs might be discounting such value in light of potential 
infringements.  
With regards to the control variables we include in the analysis, the results indicate that 
older firms receive more funds and firms receiving seed stage investments receive less (firmage 
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and seed).  The number of VCFs in the syndication also increases the amount of investment 
received by firms in the sample while the reputation of VCFs has no effect. The density of VCFs 
within a 10 miles radius from the recipient firm increases the level of first round financing for the 
firms in the sample as well. Finally, several other control variables, including the number of 
universities in the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) and the density of granted patents, do not 
affect the level of investments.  
5.2. Sensitivity analysis of baseline results 
 
The estimated empirical models presented in Table 3 are very stable. The coefficients of all the 
signal and control variables have been largely unchanged across the various specifications.  Still, 
to further test the robustness of our baseline empirical results we conducted a number of additional 
sensitivity tests. In Table 4 we present the estimates for these robustness checks only for 
Specification 2 (model 3c) and we note that the results are qualitatively similar for Specification 1 
as well.15  
---Table 4 about here--- 
Because we rely on a sample of firms that received venture capital investments, our 
estimates could suffer from selection bias if the sample firms were more likely to receive funds 
than other firms in the first place.  To check whether this potential bias influences our results in 
sensitivity test 1 we construct a Heckman selection model where in the first stage we model the 
                                                          
15 In Hoenen et al. (2014) we demonstrate the robustness of the model without the interaction terms to a number of 
observations that include a) different time frames of analysis and, b) different measures of patent quality. We obtain 
similar results when we conduct the same tests here.  Along the same lines, on top of the tests we present in section 
5.2, we also conducted a) a test where we employ the density of VCFs in a region as an alternative proxy for the 
existence of environments characterized by strong information asymmetries and b) a test where we replace the 
minimum distance to the VCF with the average distance (in case of syndicate investments). By and large, our 
estimates are qualitatively similar to the estimates reported in Table 3. 
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probability that a firm receives venture capital and in the second stage we conduct the baseline 
analysis. In the set of regressors in the first stage we include variables such as patents, founder's 
status and receipt of government grants that have been previously shown to affect the chances of 
receiving venture capital (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004; Lerner, 1999; MacMillan et al., 1986). 
To source the sample of firms that had not received venture capital funds we relied on 
proprietary data from InKnowVation reflecting all biotechnology firms that had won grants from 
the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program from 1983 to 2006.16  The dataset 
included firm-specific information such as patents and year of foundation as well as an indicator 
of whether or not the SBIR winner firms received venture capital investments, with the majority 
of those firms not having received funds from VCFs.17  The estimates of Heckman selection 
model remain similar in magnitude, sign and statistical significance to our baseline estimates and 
indicate that any potential selection bias does not materially change our findings. 
                                                          
16 The dataset included all life science winners. In order to identify the biotechnology firms we performed a keyword 
search on the business description of all the firms. We used almost 400 keywords with about 100 of them 
characterizing the vast majority of the firms in the dataset (Kolympiris et al., 2014). These keywords included 
glycosylation, oligo-nucleotide, mutation, antigen, recombinant allergens, biofiltration, glycosylation, Bacillus 
thuringiensis, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), chondrocyte differentiation, biosynthesis, recombinant enzymes, 
genetic engineering, stem cells, bioprocessing, genetic, biotic stress, genetic parameters, chimeraplasty, 
introgression, biomedicine, reverse transcriptase, glycoprotein, directional cloning, western blot, combinatorial 
biocatalysis, arabidopsis, gene (DNA) sequencing. 
17 Instead of using the age variable in the first stage of the Heckman model we use the year of foundation. We do so 
because for the age variable to be meaningful in our application we would need to model the probability that a firm 
receives venture capital investment within a specific period of time. However, by definition, such period of time 
does not exist for firms that did not receive venture capital investments.  For the selection equation, we also use only 
granted patents as measures of patent activity in the first stage because a number of recipient firms received the 
award before 2001 and as such the full list of submitted applications is not available as it was not recorded by the 
USPTO. The selection of the remaining variables in the first stage of the Heckman model is guided, primarily, by 
findings of previous literature.  To illustrate, for the selection equation we include the SBIR and the location 
dummies based on the findings that SBIR winners are more likely to attract venture capital funds (Lerner, 1999) and 
that firms located in Massachusetts or California are more likely to attract funds (Lerner, 1999). The relationship of 
those factors with the amount of venture capital raised in the first round was not replicated in the existing literature. 
As such, we consider these factors as relevant for the first but not for the second stage of the Heckman model. 
Factors for which empirical evidence is scarce, we theorize, are relevant for both stages (e.g. FounderSignal) and are 
included in both stages (we opt for FounderSignal and not AcademicSignal and EntrepreneurialSignal because of 
better model fit). Finally, when we include different groups of variables in the selection equation we find that the 
results remain largely unchanged.  
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If the amount invested in a biotechnology firm is endogenously determined with the 
distance between the VCF and the firm, our estimates would suffer from endogeneity bias.18 For 
instance, if local investors could not provide sufficient amounts of capital to local firms, the only 
option for such firms would be to raise funds from distant investors. In such a case, distance and 
the amount raised (our dependent variable) would be determined simultaneously. To test whether 
distance is an endogenous variable we performed the Hausman endogeneity test described in 
Wooldridge (2010, p. 119) and present the second stage estimates in test 2.19 The coefficient of 
the residuals of the first stage is not statistically significant, thus, rejecting endogeneity. This 
implies that our estimates are not plagued by endogeneity bias. Further, the magnitude, sign and 
statistical significance of the signal interactions remain qualitatively similar to the baseline 
estimates. 
To measure the effects of the regional environment and clustering in general, we include 
variables measuring the density of VCFs and patent activity within a 20 miles radius from the focal 
firm. However, clusters are not defined solely by geography but also through professional and 
social ties (Casper, 2007). It is, thus, possible that nearby firms might not belong in a cluster or 
that firms located further away are still part of the cluster.  To address this possibility, in sensitivity 
test 3 we replace the variables describing the regional environment with variables that take the 
value of 1 for firms located in the MSAs of the three traditional biotech clusters in the US: Boston, 
San Diego and San Francisco. As shown in Table 3, the estimates of this sensitivity test are nearly 
identical to the estimates of the baseline specification. 
                                                          
18 We thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing up this point. 
19 More specifically, we first run the reduced form regression with distance as the dependent variable against the 
exogenous variables and use the residuals of this regression as an explanatory variable in our baseline model.     
28 
 
As we explained above, we opted to represent patent activity in our baseline model with 
dummy variables that take the value of 1 if the firm was granted a patent or had applied for a patent 
before the investment and 0 otherwise. We did so chiefly because of multicollinearity concerns 
and because the left skewed distribution of patent activity made the dummy variables we used 
roughly equivalent to continuous measures.  In sensitivity tests 4 and 5 we put this modelling 
choice to test. In those tests we omit firms with well above average patent applications, thus, 
checking whether these outliers drive our estimates. In both tests the results are qualitatively 
similar to the baseline estimates and hence provide additional support to our representation of 
patent activity with dummy variables.  
Finally, in tests 6 and 7 we test for the separate significance of the interaction terms – patent 
activity measures and distance as well as founder characteristics and distance—as those are tested 
jointly in the baseline model. The coefficients are similar to the baseline coefficients we present 
in Table 3. Patent applications and the entrepreneurial experience interaction variables remains 
significant and granted patents and academic eminence interaction variables remain insignificant.      
5.3. Model specifications that include levels 
 
Our baseline specification is informative and stable. However, it is based on our choice to 
exclude the level terms of signals from the model and test the significance of the interaction terms 
of signals with distance on funding levels, alone. Our choice is driven by the high correlation 
between levels and interaction terms. This high correlation, however, may raise concerns as to 
what sort of impacts the interaction terms are picking up when included alone. In order to examine 
this issue further, in Appendix Table 2 we present estimates from specifications that a) include 
only the level terms, b) include the level and associated interaction terms one by one and c) include 
all the level and interaction terms. We derive three main conclusions from Appendix Table 2 and 
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from comparing it to Table 3. First, the magnitudes of the interaction terms in Table 3, which omits 
the level terms, and the magnitudes of the interaction terms in the models of Appendix Table 2, 
which include the level terms, are similar. The stability of the interaction terms across 
specifications suggests that these variables represent separate effects that are not influenced by the 
presence or the absence of the level terms in the models. Second, in Appendix Table 2 we observe 
a material increase in the standard errors of the founder signal interaction terms. Given the high 
correlations it is likely that the level terms, as intercept shifters, and the slope shifters provided by 
the Distance* founder signal interactions could represent similar patterns in the funding data and, 
for these cases, the models could be over-specified leading to inflated variance of those estimators 
and, eventually, incorrect inference. Finally, none of the level terms is significant when the 
interaction terms are included in the specifications. An F-test of joint significance for the level 
terms also failed to reject the hypothesis that, as a set, these effects are equal to 0; the F-test for 
specification 1 (Model 8 in Appendix Table 2) was 0.27 with a p-value of 0.85 and the F-test for 
specification 2 (Model 9 in Appendix Table 2) was 0.43 with a p-value of 0.79. It is important to 
note, that because these F-statistics have values below 1, inclusion of the level terms would 
actually reduce the adjusted R2 in the fitted models (Wooldridge, 2009 p. 201). These three main 
reasons guide our baseline specification above and support the omission of the level terms as: a) 
the baseline model explains a larger portion of the variance, it is more parsimonious and it is less 
likely to suffer from inference concerns; and b) the inferences on our testable hypotheses are not 
meaningfully affected by the omission of the level terms. 
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6. Conclusion and Discussion 
A long stream of literature based on signaling theory has analyzed the factors that make signals 
more valuable to receivers.  The general consensus in this literature is that signals are more 
valuable to receivers when transmitted in environments of elevated information asymmetries 
between senders and receivers, such as when firms are untested and when industries are risky. 
However, despite extensive evidence of increasing information asymmetries between transacting 
parties over geographic distance, the value of signals relative to geographic distance remains 
largely unknown. Against this background, and keeping in mind that signals are often more 
relevant for early stages of firm growth, in this paper we pose the following question: are signals 
of start-up firm quality more valuable to distant than nearby investors and, if so, do they lead to 
higher investments?   
To address the question we examine venture capital investments in 586 US-based 
biotechnology firms over a 10 year period. In line with the notion that information asymmetries 
are more pronounced in long distance transactions we find that firm patent activity and the business 
experience of the founder team carry a stronger signaling value for long distance transactions.  
Overall, our empirical results corroborate the idea that because tacit knowledge circulates 
mostly within local circles, it diminishes the value that receivers place on signals for local 
transactions. Notably, our analysis sheds new light on why patents and patent applications of start-
up firms attract investors.  If patents were valued mostly for their monopoly rights, we would 
expect them to attract investors, equally, in environments of low and high information 
asymmetries. If, however, they were valued primarily as a signal of unobserved firm quality, we 
would expect them to attract investors, chiefly, when information asymmetries are pronounced. 
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We find strong support for the latter argument: patent activity, especially patent applications, 
seems to attract venture capitalists mostly because of its signaling function.   
 Our study also has managerial and policy implications.  For instance, for start-up firms 
located outside the traditional venture capital hubs seeking early stage venture capital investments, 
our study suggests that signals can help them overcome any potential disadvantages of their 
location. This finding is particularly relevant because, early stage firms are often tempted to 
relocate to increase their access to financial resources (Tian, 2011). In contrast, potential senders 
of signals located close to intended receivers, may benefit more from conveying quality 
information through local networks. Our study shows that in close proximity the value of signals 
tends to diminish and, hence, the costs of signaling may outweigh the potential benefits. For policy 
makers our findings imply that signaling is a way to attract venture capital from outside the region. 
If local governments are able to assist local firms with signaling, through certification or award 
programs or technical assistance for patent and grant acquisition, this could attract distant venture 
capital and therefore contribute to the innovativeness and economic growth of the region (Samila 
and Sorenson, 2011).  
We close with a note on the limits of our study and on potential extensions.  Our focus on 
biotechnology is largely motivated by the spatial configuration and the types of investments that 
occur in the industry, which present a suitable setting for studying the strength of signals across 
different distances between senders and receivers. The spatial configuration of the biotechnology 
industry and of investments in it may not be representative of other industries thereby limiting the 
generality of our conclusions. Extending the analysis to different industries could leverage the 
presence of shorter research cycles, differential locations, industry structures, and overall 
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information asymmetries and risks thereby providing opportunities for new signals and additional 
insights.   
A potential limitation of our work is that common factors could affect the location of 
biotechnology firms and venture capital firms. For instance, biotech firms with low patent activity 
aware of its signaling value to distant investors could purposefully locate close to VCFs. If that 
holds, the analysis would be subject to an identification concern.20 Existing empirical evidence 
from a broad set of industries indicates that the effect of regional venture capital activity per se on 
firm births is not strong (Samila and Sorenson, 2010, 2011). Specifically for biotechnology the 
impact of venture capital activity on firm births is either non-existent (Kolympiris et al., 2015) or 
weakly positive and lessens even more when other factors (e.g. university presence) are explicitly 
considered (Stuart and Sorenson, 2003). While such evidence suggests that the concern at hand is 
not particularly acute, the possibility cannot be fully ruled out.   
The focus of the study coupled with data limitations does not allow us to use sharper 
measures of the regional environment in which the focal firms are located. Relevant measures 
could account for the ties between nearby organizations and the overall network structure 
surrounding the firms receiving funding. Along the same lines, investigating whether social and 
industrial distance between investors and recipient firms impacts the effects of geographic distance 
on the valuation of signals a la Sorenson and Stuart (2001) is a fruitful avenue for further work. 
Finally, the correlation of the signals and their interactions with the distance between VCFs 
and target firms in our data set constraints, somewhat, our model specification. Our empirical tests 
                                                          
20 Along the same lines, an additional identification concern could arise if venture capitalists encourage firms to 
apply for patents. Given that we measure patent activity before the first round of investment, this would hold only 
for cases under which the venture capitalist plays a role in the decision process of the firm before the investment. 
However, because of the well-established ex ante scanning function and ex post coaching function of venture 
capitalists, this sort of identification is not a particularly strong concern in our work.  
33 
 
provide some comfort on the robustness of our results but future work could explore further their 
separate effects.  
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Figure 1. Location of biotechnology firms in the sample
